This paper investigates a class of matching problems -the assignment of indivisible items to agents where some agents have prior claims to some of the items. As a running example, we will refer to the indivisible items as houses. House allocation problems are not only of theoretical interest, but also of practical importance. A house allocation mechanism assigns a set of houses (or offices, tasks, etc.) to prospective tenants, allotting at most one house to each tenant. Rents are exogenously given and there is no medium of exchange, such as money. In general some houses will have existing tenants, some houses will be empty, and some applicants for housing will be new (e.g., freshmen). The canonical examples are assignment of college students to dormitory rooms and public housing units. Other examples are assignment of offices and tasks to individuals.
nism (of the kind successfully used in London). In his experiment the unstable (and yet successful) London linear programming mechanism performs no better than the unstable (and unsuccessful) Newcastle priority matching mechanism in preventing early contracts although it performs better in terms of overall efficiency. Finally Ernan Haruvy et al. (2001) investigate the entry-level labor market for American federal law clerks and show that a centralized stable matching mechanism may not be as successful in preventing early contracts as the current decentralized system due to market specific coordination issues.
Our experiment differs from the above six experiments in both the particular mechanisms studied, and the potential field applications of the mechanisms.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I reviews the theoretical properties of the two mechanisms. Section II contains a description of the experimental design. Section III summarizes the main results of the experiments. Section IV concludes the paper.
I Theoretical Properties of the Mechanisms
We first introduce the model and then describe two mechanisms in this context.
A house allocation problem with existing tenants (Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 1999) consists of:
1. a finite set of existing tenants I E , 2. a finite set of new applicants I N , 3. a finite set of occupied houses H O = {h i } i∈I E , 4. a finite set of vacant houses H V , and 5. a list of strict preference relations P = (P i ) i∈I E ∪I N .
Here h i ∈ H O is the house that is currently occupied by the existing tenant i ∈ I E who is entitled to keep it. In other words, the existing tenant i has the squatter's rights over house h i . Each agent has use for one and only one house and has strict preferences over all houses. Without loss of generality we assume that the number of agents is the same as the number of houses. A house allocation is an assignment of houses to agents such that each agent is assigned a distinct house.
Two special cases of this model deserve mentioning. A housing market (Lloyd S. Shapley and Herbert E. Scarf, 1974 ) is a special case where there are only existing tenants and occupied houses.
A house allocation problem (Aanund Hylland and Richard Zeckhauser, 1977) is the other extreme case where there are only new applicants and vacant houses.
It is the responsibility of a centralized clearing house, e.g., the housing office, to allocate the houses among the agents. A house allocation mechanism consists of a strategy space for each agent and an outcome function which selects a lottery over house allocations for each strategy-tuple. In a direct mechanism agents simply state their preferences over houses. A house allocation mechanism is (ex-post) Pareto efficient if it gives positive weight to only Pareto efficient house allocations. A house allocation mechanism is (ex-post) individually rational if it assures every existing tenant a house that is at least as good as her own. A direct house allocation mechanism is strategy-proof (or dominant strategy incentive compatible) if no agent can ever benefit by misrepresenting her preferences.
A Random Serial Dictatorship with Squatting Rights
The random serial dictatorship with squatting rights (RSD) mechanism is commonly used in reallife applications of house allocation problems with existing tenants. Some examples include undergraduate housing at Carnegie-Mellon University, Duke University, the University of Michigan, Northwestern University, and the University of Pennsylvania. The mechanism involves four steps:
1. Each existing tenant decides whether she will enter the housing lottery or keep her current house. Those who prefer keeping their houses are assigned their houses. All other houses become available for allocation.
2. Every agent who enters the lottery reports her preferences over all available houses.
3. An ordering of all agents who enter the lottery is randomly chosen from a given distribution of orderings. This distribution may be uniform or it may favor some groups (such as seniors) over others.
4. Available houses are allocated to agents based on their reported preferences and the chosen ordering: The first agent is assigned her top choice, the next agent is assigned her top choice among the remaining houses, and so on.
While this mechanism is very popular in real-life applications, it suffers from a major deficiency.
Since it does not guarantee each existing tenant a house that is at least as good as her own, some tenants may choose to keep their houses even though they wish to move, and this may result in loss of potentially large gains from trade. Hence the RSD mechanism is neither individually rational nor Pareto efficient. It is, however, strategy-proof: truthful preference revelation is a dominant strategy for every agent who enters the lottery.
B Top Trading Cycles Mechanism
The inefficiency of the RSD is caused by the mechanism's failure to guarantee each existing tenant a house at least as good as the one she already holds. To achieve efficiency we must address this "deficiency". This is the motivation for the top trading cycles (TTC) mechanism (Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 1999):
1. Each agent reports her preferences over all houses.
2. An ordering of agents is randomly chosen from a given distribution of orderings.
3. For any given preference list and ordering, the outcome is obtained using the following you request my house-I get your turn algorithm:
(a) Assign the first agent her top choice, the second agent her top choice among the remaining houses, and so on, until someone requests the house of an existing tenant.
(b) If at that point the existing tenant whose house is requested is already assigned another house, then do not disturb the procedure. Otherwise modify the remainder of the ordering by inserting the existing tenant to the top of the line and proceed with the procedure.
(c) Similarly, insert any existing tenant who is not already served at the top of the line once her house is requested.
(d) If at any point a loop forms, it is formed by exclusively existing tenants and each of them requests the house of the tenant who is next in the loop. (A loop is an ordered list of agents (i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i k ) where agent i 1 requests the house of agent i 2 , agent i 2 requests the house of agent i 3 ,. . ., agent i k requests the house of agent i 1 .) In such cases remove all agents in the loop by assigning them the houses they request and proceed with the procedure.
The key innovation in this mechanism is that an existing tenant whose current house is requested is upgraded to the first place at the remaining of the line before her house is allocated. As a result the TTC mechanism is individually rational, as it assures every existing tenant a house that is at least as good as her own. 3
The TTC mechanism is also strategy-proof 4 and Pareto efficient. Another desirable feature is that it coincides with the competitive mechanism when restricted to housing markets 5 and with random serial dictatorship when restricted to house allocation problems. 6
In the experiment we use a variant of the TTC mechanism which gives the existing tenants the option to opt out and keep their current houses (as in RSD). Since opting out is a weakly dominated strategy for the existing tenant, theoretically this variant should yield the same outcome. There are three reasons for using this variant. First, it keeps the size of the strategy space in the two mechanisms the same, which allows for more accurate comparability between the two. Second, this variant allows us to compare the participation rates induced by the two mechanisms. Third, in real life some existing tenants might not return their applications, which has been treated as signing up for the same room, for example, at the University of Michigan. 7 3 Alternatively one can fix the inefficiency caused by the RSD mechanism using the following individually rational mechanism: First construct an initial allocation by assignning each existing tenant her own house and randomly assigning a vacant house to each newcomer and next choose the unique competitive allocation of the induced housing market as the final outcome. Tayfun Sönmez and M. UtkuÜnver (2001) show that this mechanism is equivalent to a special case of the TTC mechanism.
4 Indeed the TTC mechanism cannot be manipulated by a group of agents either: When a group of agents jointly misrepresent their preferences, if any of the agents profit then at least one of them strictly loses. 5 In a housing market there are only existing tenants and occupied houses. The competitive allocation is unique for each housing market and it coincides with the unique core allocation (Alvin E. Roth and Andrew Postlewaite, 1977) . Moreover the competitive mechanism is strategy-proof (Alvin E. Roth, 1982) and the only one which is also Pareto efficient and individually rational (Jinpeng Ma, 1994) . As a result, the competitive mechanism is considered the key mechanism for housing markets. 
II Experimental Design
We designed our experiment to compare outcomes of RSD and TTC mechanism, with particular attention to the questions of efficiency comparison and the participation decision of existing tenants.
The environment was designed to capture the key aspects of the house allocation problem and to simulate the complexity inherent in potential applications. We implemented three different treatments: the original treatment and two other treatments for robustness tests. These will be explained in turn.
In We choose to have eight existing tenants out of twelve participants based on two considerations:
(1) In field applications involving dormitory assignment or office assignment, the majority of the agents are existing tenants. (2) Since the existing tenants' behavior is crucial for the efficiency of the mechanisms, we need a fairly large number of observations.
[ In this environment we test the two mechanisms: RSD and TTC. In both mechanisms, existing tenants are explicitly given an option to keep their houses and thus not enter the lottery.
Under RSD, truthful preference revelation is a dominant strategy for the newcomers. In case an existing tenant chooses to enter the lottery, truthful preference revelation is also a dominant strategy for her. In this case the outcome depends on the random ordering and she may end up with a worse house than she holds. Thus we expect to see some opting out.
Under TTC, truthful preference revelation is a dominant strategy for everyone. In addition individual rationality of the top trading cycles mechanism implies that opting out is a dominated strategy for existing tenants. Thus we expect to see existing tenants always participating.
Both mechanisms were implemented as one-shot games of incomplete information. Each subject knew her own payoff table, but not the other participants' payoff tables. They did know that "different participants might have different payoff tables." This information condition is a good approximation of reality. To check robustness, we also conducted an experiment to compare the performance of RSD and TTC when agents have complete information about all payoff tables.
Results from that experiment can be found in Yan Chen and Tayfun Sönmez (1999). All qualitative results from the current experiment hold under complete information as well.
We use one-shot games to evaluate the mechanisms since in real world applications the mechanisms will likely be used in a one-shot setting. While it is true that in college many students go through the house allocation process more than once, each time they face a different population, different sets of dormitory rooms and different preferences. Hence, from a theoretical perspective, each house allocation process is a one-shot game. Without any practice rounds or opportunities to learn over time, one-shot implementation presents the most realistic and the toughest test for the mechanisms. 9
To test robustness of the results with respect to changes in size and environments, we conducted two additional treatments. In the large treatment we replicate the economy in the original treatment by a factor of five, while keeping other features of the original treatment the same. describe which one of them moves to the head of the assignment queue once their house type is requested, "Among these existing tenants, the one who is closest to the top of the queue is given priority and moved to the top of the priority queue, directly in front of the requester." To assess the robustness of the results with respect to different parameter conditions, we conducted a third treatment, the random treatment, where we randomly generated a payoff matrix 10 subject to the following constraints: (1) For each agent the payoff for each type of housing is randomly drawn from {1, 2, · · ·, 15} without replacement; (2) Existing tenants' houses range from their second to the seventh choice, for the same reason as stated in choosing the original environment. Compared with the original treatment, the random treatment only differs in the payoff matrix, which is shown in Table 2 .
[ Table 2 about here.]
For the original treatment five independent sessions for each mechanism (
In experimental economics, one-shot implementations have been studied in various contexts (Reinhard Selten and Axel O. Ockenfels, 1998, Klaus Abbink, Bernd Irlenbusch and Elke Renner, 2000) . 10 See Alvin E. Roth, Ido Erev and Robert Slonim (1998) for an example of using randomly generated environments for experiments.
were conducted in September 1999 at the University of Michigan. 11 In September 2000 we conducted two independent sessions for each mechanism under the large treatment (R l 1, R l 2, T l 1 and T l 2), and five independent sessions for each mechanism (R o 1-R o 5, T o 1-T o 5) under the random treatment.
[ Table 3 about here.] Table 3 summarizes features of experimental sessions, including dates experiments were conducted, environments, subject per session and total number of subjects under each treatment. All sessions were conducted by hand. Our subjects were undergraduate students at the University of Michigan. No subject participated in more than one session. This gives us a total of 24 independent sessions and 480 subjects. Each session consisted of one round only. The sessions lasted between 40-45 minutes, with the first 20-25 minutes being used for instructions. The conversion rate was $1 for all sessions. Each subject also received a participation fee of $3 in addition to their earnings from the experiment. The average earning (including participation fee) was $14.7.
Each subject randomly drew an envelope with an ID number and instructions inside, then was seated in a chair in a classroom. The experimenter read the instructions aloud. Subjects asked questions, which were answered in public. Subjects were then given ten minutes to read the instructions again at their own pace and to make their decisions. At the end of ten minutes the experimenter collected the decisions and asked volunteers to come to the front to draw pingpong balls out of an urn, which generated the initial priority queue. For the original and random treatments, the experimenter allocated all houses in public according to the specific house allocation mechanism, and paid the subjects at the end of the experiment. For the large treatment, because of the complexity involved in computing the results by hand, the experimental sessions ended after the initial priority queue was generated. Then the experimenter put the subjects' decisions and queues into a computer to generate the allocations, announced the allocations and paid the subjects the next day.
Experimental instructions and data are available from the authors upon request. Within each 11 There were also two incomplete sessions for RSD, in each of which one subject left in the middle of the experiment and the experimenter allocated all houses as if there were twelve houses and eleven participants. Since that might have changed the perception of the problem for others, we exclude these two sessions in the analysis. Results including these two sessions are not qualitatively different (they are in fact stronger) and are available from the authors upon request.
treatment the instructions for the two mechanisms are identical except for the "House Allocation
Method" section. Across treatments, minimal changes in the instructions are made only in the few places as explained above.
III Results
Three questions are important in evaluating the mechanisms. The first is the efficiency of the mechanisms. The second is whether individuals play their dominant strategies. The third is the robustness of the experimental results with respect to changes in the environment and the size of the economy. In Subsection A, we report and analyze the experimental results. In Subsection B, we report simulation results.
A Experimental Results
To evaluate the aggregate performance of the mechanisms, we compare the efficiency generated by each mechanism. To extract the maximum information from the data, we look at three efficiency measures -observed efficiency, expected efficiency and the recombinant estimation of mean efficiency.
[ Tables 4 and 5 about here.] Table 4 reports the efficiency estimates under all three measures for the original and large treatments. Table 5 reports the efficiency estimates under all three measures for the random treatment. Observed efficiency is calculated by taking the ratio of the sum of actual earnings of all subjects in a session and the Pareto-optimal earnings of the group. The unique Pareto-optimal group earning is 171 for the original treatment, and 855 for the large treatment. Since there are many Pareto optimal allocations with different group payoffs under the random treatment, we use the Monte Carlo method to calculate the mean of efficient payoffs. That is, we randomly generate one million queues and let each participant pick her best choice among the available houses down the queue and calculate the average payoff over one million assignments, which is 164.24.
RESULT 1 (Observed Efficiency) : The observed efficiency of TTC is significantly higher than that of RSD. Tables 4 and 5 present the observed efficiency of the two mechanisms.
SUPPORT. Column 3 in
Permutation tests 12 show that the observed efficiency of TTC is significantly higher than that of RSD: p = 0.0079 (one-tailed) for the original treatment, p < 0.0001 (one-tailed) for the large treatment, p = 0.0198 (one-tailed) for the random treatment.
Given the participation decisions and the participants' stated preference orderings, the observed efficiency is dependent upon the realization of the random selection of the queue in which the mechanism assigns those participants. In an experimental session we observe only one out of n! possible queues, where n is the number of participants entering the lottery. To get an idea of the expected efficiency in each session, we calculate the average efficiency over one million randomly generated lotteries within each session.
RESULT 2 (Expected Efficiency) :
The expected efficiency of TTC is significantly higher than that of RSD. Tables 4 and 5 In the actual estimation we randomly generated two million groups (and one queue for each group) under each mechanism to estimate the mean (μ), variance (σ 2 ) and covariance (ϕ) of the data.
SUPPORT. Column 4 in
12 The permutation test, also known as the Fisher randomization test, is a nonparametric version of a difference of two means t-test (See, e.g., Sidney Siegel and N. John Castellan, Jr., 1988, p.95-100.) . By pooling the 10 independent observations, the p-value is obtained as the exact probability of observing a separation between the two treatments as the one observed when the pooled observations are randomly divided into two equal sized groups. This test uses all of the information in the sample, thus has power-efficiency of 100%. [ Table 6 about here.]
SUPPORT. Table 6 presents existing tenants' participation rates for each session under all three treatments. T-tests of proportions show that the participation rate of existing tenants under TTC is significantly higher than that of RSD: z = 2.558 (p = 0.0052, one-tailed) under the original treatment, z = 4.720 (p < 0.001, one-tailed) under the large treatment and z = 2.558 (p = 0.0052, one-tailed) under the random treatment.
Therefore, existing tenants' participation rate is significantly higher under TTC than under RSD. We next examine the size and environment effects on participation rates.
RESULT 5 (Size and Environment Effects on Participation) : Under each mechanism, the differences in participation rates between the original treatment and the large treatment, between
the original and the random treatment are not statistically significant.
[ Table 6 about here.]
SUPPORT. Table 6 Result 5 is important because it demonstrates that existing tenants' participation rates induced by each mechanism are robust with respect to variations in size and environment.
Although existing tenants' participation rate is significantly higher under TTC than under RSD, it is still 21% below the theoretically predicted 100% participation rate under TTC. We now explore the possibility that various factors might contribute to individual's tendency to participate under each mechanism. We first examine the effects of payoffs from existing tenants' own houses (v o ) on participation decisions.
[ Table 7 about here.] Table 7 presents the number and proportion of existing tenants who opted out and the payoffs they received from their own houses. Under both mechanisms, as the payoff from own house increases, the proportion of opting out also increases. There are two possible explanations for why some existing tenants opted out under TTC. First, since TTC is relatively complex, it requires some effort, or decision cost, to understand the mechanism. Some subjects, content with what they could earn by opting out, decided not to bother to try to understand the instructions and thus avoided the decision cost. This explains why we observe more opting out with higher payoffs. Second, we cannot rule out that some subjects incurred the decision cost but still did not understand how the TTC mechanism works. This might explain why we observe some opting out in low payoff ranges.
In RSD, however, since the mechanism itself is not individually rational, many more existing tenants with a wider range of payoffs opted out.
[ Table 9 .
[ Therefore, we will base the simulation analysis in the next section on Table 8 .
Once the existing tenant decides to participate, then truthful preference revelation is a dominant strategy for both TTC and RSD. However, as many experiments have shown, subjects do not always play dominant strategies. A little over two-thirds of the subjects revealed their preferences truthfully, i.e., ranked the houses in terms of decreasing payoffs. Among the subjects who misrepresented their preferences, we can classify the misrepresentation in five categories. Table 11 presents the number of cases and proportion of misrepresentation under each of the five categories.
[ Table 11 (switch-top-two), subjects switched their top two choices which did not belong to the case of vacant house effect. This might be due to a perception that people might have similar preferences and therefore their top choice might be more competitive. In three cases (switch-lower-two) subjects switched their lower two choices which did not belong to the case of vacant house effect. In two cases (duplicate ranking), the rankings were monotone decreasing in payoffs, however, the subjects ranked A (or B or C or D) twice, thus the rankings were incomplete. 13 In nearly a quarter of the misrepresentation cases (random) the ranking seemed totally random. It might be due to the subjects' confusion. Comparing RSD o and RSD l , TTC o and TTC l , a noticeable size effect on the pattern of misrepresentation is that the proportions of the Random category increased by a factor of five.
RESULT 7 (Size and Environment Effects on Truth-telling) : Under both mechanisms, the difference in truth-telling rates between the original treatment and the large treatment is not statistically significant, while the proportion of truth-telling under the random treatment is weakly higher than that under the original treatment.
SUPPORT. Table 10 Result 7 says that under both mechanisms the size effect on truth-telling is not statistically significant. However, we do observe a weakly significant environment effect. If we compare columns RSD o with RSD r , and TTC o with TTC r in Table 11 , there is a notable decrease of the number of misrepresentations due to the vacant house effect, which account for nearly two-thirds of the misrepresentations. This might be due to the properties of the payoff matrices: in the original environment (Table 1) [ Table 12 about here.] Table 12 tabulates the proportion of agents doing vacant house manipulations as a function of different types of first and second choices. Over 90% of the agents with vacant house manipulation has at least one of their top choices full. Only 9% of these agents have both of their top choices vacant.
Having analyzed the size and environment effects on participation and truth-telling, we now examine the size and environment effects on efficiency.
RESULT 8 (Size Effect on Efficiency) : Under each mechanism, the difference in efficiency under the original treatment and the large treatment is not statistically significant. Table 4 Result 9 shows that there is an environment effect on efficiency. Over all three treatments the efficiency under TTC is significantly higher than that under RSD, although the magnitude of the difference in efficiency might vary when the environments are different. To explore the performance of the two mechanisms over a large number of different environments, different scale of the market and different strategy distributions, we resort to simulation analysis.
SUPPORT.

B Simulation Results
In this section we report simulation results with varying sizes of the economy, environments, as well as the strategies inputted into the simulation. In each simulation treatment we randomly generate fifty payoff matrices to further explore the robustness of the results with respect to changes in environments. We also significantly increase the scale of the market. We simulate the nature of the participation decisions using the logit participation rule based on the difference model that was estimated from the actual data and reported in Table 8 .
[ Table 13 about here.] Table 13 reports the mean efficiency over fifty randomly generated environments under each mechanism for each simulation treatment. In the first set of simulations, we use the same percentages on participation (Table 8 ) and the same distribution over types of preference orderings (Table 11) as observed in the actual experiment. We then vary the scale of the market (n = 12, 60, 300, 900, 1500) and use fifty randomly generated payoff matrices for each n to check whether the same efficiency ranking of the two mechanisms would be preserved. In each Monte
Carlo simulation, we use 1,000 randomly generated queues 14 to calculate the Pareto-optimal payoffs as well as the agents' aggregate payoffs from each envirnoment and for each mechanism.
RESULT 10 (Calibration Based on Observed Behavior) :
As the scale of market increases, the mean efficiency of TTC over fifty randomly generated environments remains significantly higher than that of RSD.
SUPPORT. Rows 3 and 4 of Table 13 report the mean efficiency and standard error over fifty randomly generated environments for each mechanism and each n. T-tests of each pair yield
Result 10 shows that the same efficiency ranking of the two mechanisms is preserved as we significantly increase the scale of the market and calibrate based on the actual observed behavior. Indeed, it is preserved under each of the 250 random environments. In the next two sets of simulations strategies inputted into the simulations go beyond those actually submitted by the participants of the experiments.
In the second set of simulations, we examine the performance of the two mechanisms as the proportion of random decisions increase. From row 5 to 12, we increase the proportion of random preference orderings and decrease the proportion of truth-telling accordingly, while keeping the same participation decisions as those actually observed in the experiment. In rows 11 and 12 (zerointelligence 15 ), all decisions, preference ranking and participation, are completely random. This provides a benchmark for the performance of the two mechanisms.
RESULT 11 (Effects of Random Decision Making) : As the proportion of random decisions increases, the performance of both mechanisms decreases, and the gap between the performance of TTC and RSD decreases.
SUPPORT. From Row 3 to row 11 of Table 13 , for each n and each mechanism the efficiency decreases, while for each n the gap between TTC and RSD also decreases. The efficiency of the two mechanisms becomes indistinguishable with zero-intelligence participants (row 11).
In the third set of simulations, we explore the effects of education. There are two sources for the loss of efficiency: (1) nonparticipation of existing tenants; and (2) manipulation of preferences. In actual implementation of RSD the latter can be avoided by educating the agents while the former cannot be avoided by education. In contrast, in TTC all inefficiency can be avoided by education.
Therefore, in the simulations we separate the two effects in RSD by using the actual participation data while assuming truthful preference revelation. In TTC we use truthful preference revelation and 100% participation rate.
RESULT 12 (Education) : SUPPORT. The last two rows in Table 13 report the efficiency under education. Comparing row 3 to row 13 we see only a small improvement in the efficiency of RSD, and a significant improvement under TTC.
Result 12 shows that in the actual implementation of the two mechanisms, if the planner (e.g. the housing office) can educate the participants effectively, we do not expect the efficiency of RSD to improve by a significant amount, while the efficiency of TTC can potentially reach 100%.
Overall, TTC is more efficient than RSD because it induces significantly higher participation rate of the existing tenants. These results suggest that replacing RSD with TTC in practice can significantly improve allocation efficiency.
IV Concluding Remarks
House allocation problems exemplify an interesting class of theoretical mechanism design problems, which also have important practical implications.
Currently many universities use some variant of the random serial dictatorship with squatting rights (RSD) mechanism, which is strategy-proof but not individually rational, and hence not Pareto efficient either. A simple mechanism, the top trading cycles (TTC) mechanism, was proposed by Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (1999) , as an alternative to RSD. The top trading cycles mechanism is not only strategy-proof, but also individually rational and Pareto efficient. In order to evaluate the actual performance of TTC relative to RSD when they are implemented among boundedly rational individuals, we designed an experiment to test these mechanisms in an environment which preserves all interesting features of the problem.
Our experimental evidence shows the TTC mechanism produces significantly more efficient allocations than the RSD mechanism. The mean efficiency of the TTC mechanism is 88% of full efficiency. In contrast, RSD only achieves 74% of full efficiency. The average efficiency gain is about 18% in our environment. The difference between the mechanisms is explained by the fact that significantly more existing tenants chose to enter the applicant pool under the TTC mechanism, as predicted by theory. Under each mechanism a little more than two-thirds of the subjects truthfully revealed their preferences. Our result suggests that replacing the random serial dictatorship with squatting rights mechanism with the top trading cycles mechanism in practice can significantly improve allocation efficiency.
. Note: Significant at: * 10-percent level; ** 5-percent level; *** 1-percent level. 
